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Wormwholes: A Commentary 
on K. F. Schaffner's "Genes, Behavior, 
and Developmental Emergentism"* 
Scott F. Gilbertt 
Department of Biology, Martin Biological Laboratories, Swarthmore College 
Erik M. Jorgensen 
Department of Biology, University of Utah 
Although Caenorhabditis elegans was chosen and modified to be an organism that 
would facilitate a reductionist program for neurogenetics, recent research has provided 
evidence for properties that are emergent from the neurons. While neurogenetic ad- 
vances have been made using C elegans which may be useful in explaining human 
neurobiology, there are severe limitations on C. elegans to explain any significant hu- 
man behavior. 
1. Introduction. The Bristol N2 strain of Caenorhabditis elegans is an 
organism constructed for the genetic analysis of behavior. It has an 
invariant cell lineage (the cell divisions which occur between the fertil- 
ized egg and the adult are largely identical and always produce the 
same set of tissues), an invariant nervous system whose 302 neurons 
have reproducible synaptic connectivity, and an invariant genotype. 
Moreover, this strain of C. elegans has a repertoire of behaviors that 
it performs on a very limited environment, a flat agar surface supplied 
with a uniform pad of identical bacteria. The very richness of life that 
the Developmentalist Challenge claims engenders diversity have been 
hunted down and eliminated from C. elegans research. 
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Ken Schaffner has now turned to this organism-an organism "de- 
signed" to show that the basis for behavior lies in the genes-to ask 
whether it supports the precepts of the Developmentalist Challenge. 
The main issues of the debate can be distilled to the following five 
questions: 
1) Are discrete behaviors determined by single genes? 
2) Is behavior an emergent property? 
3) Will genetic analysis in C. elegans reveal the origin of behavioral 
variation? 
4) How does knowledge gained from C. elegans bear on human 
behavior? 
5) Do genes regulate "higher' behaviors unique to animals like 
humans? 
2. Are Discrete Behaviors Determined by Single Genes? In the context of 
a whole organism, a single gene can determine a behavior. In C. elegans, 
the most compelling examples (and those discussed by Schaffner) are 
the genes encoding the mechanosensory receptors and the odorant re- 
ceptors, for example, the odr-10 gene. This gene encodes the odorant 
receptor for diacetyl. In the absence of a functioning copy of the odr- 
10 gene, the animal simply does not show movement (chemotaxis) to 
diacetyl. Thus, in this sense, odr-10 determines attraction to diacetyl 
(Sengupta et al. 1996). 
That genes affect behavior and in some sense determine behavior is 
obvious in humans, as well as in C. elegans. Children with Angelman 
syndrome generally have inappropriate laughter, while children with 
Prader-Willi Syndrome have an insatiable appetite. Boys lacking the 
gene for hypoxanthine phosphosphoribosyl transferase have an uncon- 
trollable urge towards self-mutilation, while those with William's Syn- 
drome tend to be gregarious and empathetic. As yet, we do not un- 
derstand how the genes involved in these syndromes confer these 
personality traits to the afflicted individual. 
Still these genes do not determine a behavior. The HPRT gene of 
Lesch-Nyhan syndrome encodes a purine-salvage enzyme, not a com- 
pulsion. Genes do not act in a vacuum, and genetic analyses measure 
the effect of the loss or gain of gene function in an intact organism, 
that is, where all other genes are intact and functioning. Mice lacking 
the HPRT gene do not share the human behavioral phenotype. Thus, 
the geneticist determines the function of a gene by analyzing the dif- 
ference between an intact individual and a second "identical" individ- 
ual which only differs at this single locus. Thus, a gene may be an 
essential component of any behavior, but it does not "determine" it. 
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3. Is Behavior an Emergent Property of Many Genes? While odr-10 may 
encode a protein essential in binding diacetyl, more complex behavior, 
such as the actual movement of the worm toward the source of diacetyl, 
is diffusely encoded. This movement requires the products of a myriad 
of genes to construct and operate a motor circuit. (Here it is important 
to identify the level of the behavior, and Schaffner sometimes suggests 
that it is the worm's ability to detect diacetyl; at other times he suggests 
it is the ability of the worm to move towards the source of this com- 
pound.) 
One would have to conclude that behavior is an emergent property 
from the levels of the gene or the neuron. Certainly there is nothing in 
the nature of the gene or of the neuron which could allow us to predict 
the nature of behavior that arises from it. We already know almost the 
entire DNA sequence of the C. elegans genome, but the predicted be- 
havior of the animal does not emerge from this knowledge. We also 
know the complete neural connectivity of the worm, but the behaviors 
of the animal cannot be read from the patterns of neuronal connections. 
A behavior such as chemotaxis occurs in a network or field in which 
the interactions of several genes and gene products are occuring. Thus 
the knocking out of any one of them-the genes involved in forming the 
odorant receptor, the genes encoding the proteins that transmit this sig- 
nal to the cell body of specific neurons, the genes involved in allowing 
other neurons to form synapses with particular muscles, the genes in- 
volved in neuromuscular adhesion and muscular contraction-would 
prevent the behavior. To say that a particular gene "controls" a complex 
behavior is akin to saying that a person scored the "winning" basket in 
a 100-point basketball game (see Wheeler 1991, Gottlieb 1992). Simi- 
larly, to partition a behavior into its genetic and environmental com- 
ponents is akin to saying that the player scoring that goal was acting 
independently of his or her teamates and the opposing team. 
4. Will Genetic Analysis in C. elegans Reveal the Origin of Behavioral 
Variation? The behavioral biologist cares about variability in a popu- 
lation, why certain individuals act differently from one another. Dar- 
win's interest in inheritance focused on these subtle variations in the 
behaviors in a population. On the other hand, these subtle variations 
in behavior are just the sort of thing that a good Mendelian geneticist 
abhors. The Darwinian concept of the gene was incremental in nature; 
many genes are thought to act in concert to produce a behavior. By 
contrast, the Mendelian concept of the gene was discrete, each gene 
regulating a defined trait and has an invariant relationship between an 
allele and phenotype. (Neither Darwin nor Mendel used the term 
"gene," nevertheless each had a concept of the unit of inheritance). In 
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the creation of model organisms for the study of genetics, the variability 
which is so important to the evolutionary biologist is bred out. With this 
standard reagent, the geneticist can look at genes in a "+" or "-", 
or normal or abnormal, manner. To a geneticist, genes have discrete 
outputs, they are digital in nature. This is largely for practical reasons: 
we cannot follow, map, and clone a gene unless there is a discrete trait 
associated with its presence and absence. For this reason, screens for 
behavioral mutants preordain an outcome which indicates that each 
gene regulates a discrete behavior. But this may be a fallacy of the 
technique and not reflect reality. Moreover, when mutations emerge 
with complex phenotypes (such as the inability to move towards any 
compound), we tend to discard them. 
Thus, C. elegans research will tend to indicate a discrete relationship 
between genes and behavior. The behavioral biologist cares about sub- 
tle variations that can be as diffuse as personality traits, just the sort 
of thing that a geneticist abhors. For the behavioral biologist, the be- 
havior is the output of developmental history, the physical environ- 
ment, one's status in a population, contingent personal history, and 
the sum inheritance of one's genotype. This is unsatisfying to the re- 
ductionist behavioral geneticist because behavior becomes simply de- 
scriptive of what is observed. It becomes a historical study. If a worm 
had personality, a C. elegans behavioral geneticist would most certainly 
ignore it, and the reasons for this obstinancy are valid: the genetic 
inputs into behavior have not yet been determined. We first need to 
define the limitations on behavior imposed by genetics. Then, perhaps, 
future generations can fix an input on the more difficult phenomena of 
environmental variability and chance. 
5. How Does Knowledge Gained from C. elegans Bear on Human Be- 
havior? Work in C. elegans has shown that genes can have very discrete 
effects on simple behaviors. But the behaviors in which we are most 
interested are complex human behaviors-consciousness, attention, 
agency-and these we will never understand these by studying C. ele- 
gans. With C elegans we have a hope of understanding the relation- 
ships of genes to neurons, from neuron to circuit, from circuit to be- 
havior. Certainly, principles concerning simple behaviors learned in C. 
elegans will obtain in humans. We expect that the mechanisms under- 
lying even more complex behaviors such as learning or the emergent 
properties of circuits will be shared in worms and humans. Although 
the principles distilled from such studies will obtain in humans, it does 
not follow that we will understand human behavior at the level that 
concerns the philosopher. The dangerous assumption here is that the 
behavior of C. elegans translates to humans; but in fact many of the 
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behaviors we are exploring are no more complicated than the knee jerk 
reflex in humans which only involves 3 neurons. Similarly in C. elegans 
most behaviors only encompass neurons at three levels: the sensory 
neurons, interneurons, and motor neurons. C. elegans offers a bewil- 
dering richness of behavior with only 302 neurons, and the behaviors 
of genetically identical nematodes on an isotropic environment are of- 
ten different. One of us (E.J.) has mutants in which most worms lie 
straight in a paralyzed manner; but a fraction of them will consistently 
take on a quite different "curly" posture. A "cloned" animal does not 
breed true in relationship to this posture but reproduces the original 
distribution of phenotypes. There is a stochastic influence. In organ- 
isms with the same inheritance, a small set of neurons with identical 
connections, and the same environment, there are still behavioral dif- 
ferences as a result of chance events during development. What com- 
plexity does the human offer with 1012 neurons, some of them having 
thousands of connections with other neurons? What complexity is then 
added by having some neurons which respond to the rich abiotic, bi- 
otic, and social environments given to humans? 
So what have we learned from C. elegans that will bear on humans? 
We have learned that genetic differences can affect behavior. The ques- 
tion is not "do genes control behavior"? Yes, they can. But rather, "to 
what extent do genes control behavior?" In fact, in some sense, we 
already know that genes can control consciousness and free will. There 
are several human mental retardation and behavioral syndromes (such 
as those mentioned earlier) wherein conscious behavior is altered by 
the loss of individual genes. Does this explain consciousness or free 
will? No. Or at least no better than atomic structure and quantum 
physics explain the emergence of life. 
6. Do genes regulate "higher' behaviors unique to animals like humans? 
If genes clearly affect behavior, what is all the fuss about? The issue 
that upsets certain scientists is raised by the popular press: do our genes 
determine our behavior? Are we meaty marionettes jerked about by our 
genes? We agree with Lewontin that it is very dangerous to ascribe 
complex behaviors solely to genotype. A deterministic philosophy is 
dangerous for an organism with consciousness, agency, and different 
environments. If homosexuality were genetic, then why aren't all 
Greeks practicing bisexuals today? If our genotype determines our be- 
havioral phenotype, how can there be people who undergo major per- 
sonality changes within their lifetime? 
Another fallacy of these debates is the Nature vs. Nurture dichot- 
omy. First, measures of heritability are not fixed. Heritability is a mea- 
sure of the degree a trait is inherited in a certain environment. It need 
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not even be a genetic parameter (Lewontin 1970, Block 1995). In C. 
elegans research, we attempt to keep variations in the environment to 
a minimum and thereby maximize the heritability of a trait. In humans, 
a particular allele of a gene could be exposed to similar or radically 
different environments and the heritability will vary as a consequence. 
Second, the variance seen in such measures is often attributed to the 
environment-specifically, the contribution that does not come from 
inheritance must come from the environment-but this is not neces- 
sarily so. Differences in connectivity could be caused by stochastic de- 
velopmental effects during development (see Schnabel 1997). The ner- 
vous system also seems to encourage such differences by the "winner 
takes all" mechanisms caused by Hebbian rules of neuronal connec- 
tions. Thus, differences in neural connections and their strengths may 
emerge from developmental noise, respecification by stimuli, and by 
selective mechanisms that occur in development. 
A third fallacy is that animal studies can reveal the entire human 
behavioral repertoire. While humans are definitely animals, animals are 
not humans. Darwin noted the domestication of animals as evidence 
that behavioral traits have a genetic basis, and breeders have noted 
that single-gene inheritance can account for differences in the behaviors 
of domesticated mammals. This is to be expected, since there is an 
obvious endocrine component to certain behaviors. But human behav- 
iors also have more complex levels. If you wish to curb aggressive 
behaviors in a bull, you can castrate him. If you wish to curb aggressive 
behaviors in a man, threat of castration is often sufficient. And these 
two mechanisms can act through different pathways (i.e., threat of 
castration need not reduce testosterone levels, etc.). Moreover, there 
will be variations in the responses to threats, and these responses also 
are a component of behavior. 
Between the gene and the behavior there are multiple levels. Having 
a gene does not mean that it is necessarily transcribed, and transcribing 
the gene does not necessarily mean that the mRNA will be processed 
and translated into an active protein. If the protein is active in a neuron, 
it does not mean that it will contribute to the function of the neuron, 
and if the neuron functions, it can act differently in different networks. 
Like certain genes that synthesize enzymes in the liver or crystallins in 
the lens (the same protein having different functions), the properties of 
a gene product depend upon its context. The deletion of thefosB genes 
from mice will change the nursing behavior of the mother (Brown et 
al. 1996), but nursing is not the "function" of the transcription factor 
encoded by this gene. The idea that development is not a simple conduit 
but an interactive maze that modulates what genes "do" has become 
a major component of C. elegans neurobiology. 
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7. So Why Do Genes Sell? Ken Schaffner has admirably catalogued 
eleven theses of this Developmental Critique, but on whose door 
should he nail them? Two churches on which to post the theses would 
be those housing behavioral geneticists and journalists. These two 
groups interact synergistically, each positively feeding back on the 
other. The newspapers trumpet that behavioral geneticists have iden- 
tified such things as the "gay gene," the "alcoholism gene," and the 
"depression gene." Afterwards, when other laboratories cannot repli- 
cate these findings and the scientific reports are quietly withdrawn, the 
public is not told about the withdrawal (see Mann 1994, Nelkin and 
Lindee 1995, Harris 1997). Our culture subscribes to a molecular phre- 
nology, and genetic causation sells. Why do people "want" to hear that 
genes are responsible for behaviors? (The null hypothesis is to say that 
this behavior is encoded into the genome, presumably as an evolution- 
ary adaptation; but we won't say that). On one level, genetic determin- 
ism becomes a useful way both to avoid responsibility and to define 
certain groups or individuals as being naturally bad (or good). On a 
deeper level, genetic causation appears so compelling because that 
many people believe that genes are the essence of our identity and 
ethnicity. They have become our "soul" (Nelkin and Lindee 1995, Har- 
away 1997). 
8. Summary. In summary, do genes control behavior? Yes. But can we 
predict behavior from genes: no more than we can predict the evolution 
of mosquitos from understanding particle physics. But neither are we 
faced with anarchy. Behavior is limited by genes. There is a behavioral 
repertoire associated with each organism. Schaffner is quite right that 
C. elegans neurobiologists will obtain the simple solutions: "a necessary 
condition," those elements that are the uniquely required components, 
but not the complete set. It is doubtful that we will understand the 
relative contribution of each gene to a specific behavior. By using 
C. elegans, neurobiologists have been able to document the complexity 
that is inherent in a very simple neural system. And here may be the 
place where the developmental critique of the simple reductionist ap- 
proach to behavior is receiving its best evidence. 
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